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19-24 août 1914, Givet, Ardennes, France.  
Gare de chemins de fer à la frontière Belge 
 
«  Passage de troupes, de blesses des lignes de Charleroi (Belgique) 
...un grand diable de tirailleur blesse aux jambes a son pantalon rouge de sang de la hanche au 
genou. 
a notre question, il nous répond ’Pas sang à moi, ça Boche, zigouille ‘  
les autres tirailleurs que j'ai vu se trouvaient dans les mêmes conditions… » 
 
English Translation of Excerpt 
 
August 19-24, 1914 Givet, Ardennes, France 
Railroad station at the Belgian border 
 
Trains arriving carrying wounded from the Charleroi (Belgium) front line 
…A tirailleur (Senegalese) as big as a devil with a leg wound, and his trousers covered with 
blood from the hip to the knee. Answering our question [How were you wounded?], he 
responded “Not my blood, but the Boche’s [German], zigouille [I got him]” 
The other tirailleurs I saw were in similar conditions… 




 The First World War was likely the most important conflict in defining European history 
and cultural identity. To this day its profound cultural impacts can be seen. However, while the 
Great War is often mischaracterized as a conflict solely between European forces, the war was a 
truly global affair. This was done by bringing colonial subjects from the fringes of the various 
European empires to fight on the frontlines of the war in Europe. While both the British and 
French made use of their colonial holdings as sources of soldiers during the First World War, the 
French would do so to a much greater extent. The French army would become a cosmopolitan 
force, bringing people from all over the empire to fight in the fields of France during the Great 
War. 
 This interaction between white soldiers and commanding officers with colonial troops of 
people of color would illustrate how dynamics of race played out in the French Empire at the 
beginning of the 20th century. While institutionalized racism was still a very important aspect of 
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French, especially colonial policy, the army provided a way in which certain racial boundaries 
could be breached within the metropole. The way in which the French army dealt with race and 
their colonial non-white soldiers was also quite different than how other allied armies did so, 
which led to conflict between the heads of the armies. This was certainly the case with the 
American expeditionary force which brought over African-American soldiers to the Western 
Front in 1917 when they entered the war. 
 The purpose of this paper is to explore how the French colonial army came into being, as 
well as investigate the relationship between colonial soldiers and their white French commanding 
officers. This will be done by delving into then Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mangin’s 1910 book 
La Force Noire, which argued for the creation of a French African colonial army. By studying 
these relationships and the history of the creation of the colonial army, the French understanding 
of race in the military should become visible. The way in which the French army dealt with the 
issue of race and racism will then be compared to the way in which American officers interacted 
and treated their non-white soldiers. This will be done through the examination of the Linard 
Circulaire, a French army memo reflecting the American view on how to deal with African –
American units. This discussion of the French colonial army and its use during the Great War 
will end by observing the ways in which the fighting of these troops is remembered in 
monuments. 
Review of Previous Literature 
 
Richard S. Fogarty is one of the main historians on the topic of African soldiers from the 
French colonies and their role in the First world war. His book,  Race and War in France, 
illustrates the paradoxical nature of the French colonial army during the First World War, 
founded on both the ideals of republicanism and colonialism. Through studying and analyzing 
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the writings of various military and colonial officers and soldiers as well as those of French 
politicians, before and during the First World War, Fogarty illustrates how perceived racial 
differences and needs to uphold the colonial systems kept colored troops in a liminal zone 
between imperial subjects and free French citizens. Fogarty conveys that colonial troops 
experienced a certain degree of privileges within the French military, such as being able to fight 
in the war in the first place, when compared to the colonial and colored troops of other imperial 
powers at the time. However, Fogarty shows that the systems of racism and colonialism held by 
the French Republic kept these undoubtedly French soldiers from reaching true equality with 
their European counterparts, and that the  view of “color-blind” France or French army is not 
true.1 
 Fogarty begins by discussing the historical use of colonial troops in French armies, which 
occurred as early as the 17th century. North African soldiers also fought on the mainland during 
the Franco-Prussian war. In this way, Fogarty demonstrates that the use of non-white colonial 
troops within metropolitan France was not without precedent. He then moves on to explain why 
colonial troops were brought into the Great War. Drawing on sources from both military officers 
and colonial governors, Fogarty explains that for both logistical and ideological reasons 
stemming both from republicanism and colonialism, it was decided to train and arm colonial 
soldiers to fight for France. For some officers, the colonial soldiers were just another resource 
that the French empire could use for its benefit. For others, it represented a way to bring soldiers 
into a larger French republican identity. Fogarty interestingly notes that other nations, such as 
Great Britain, were less willing to bring in troops from their own colonies, as that could go 
against the narrative of white supremacy that these colonial empires relied upon. However, 
                                                     
1 Richard Standish Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects In the French Army, 
1914-1918 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 32-34. 
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Fogarty claims that the need for more soldiers as well as ideological motivators in either 
assimilating or associating colonial peoples with French republicanism overpowered these 
reservations. Fogarty then goes on to explain that beliefs on race and white supremacy greatly 
dictated the structure of the regiments of colonial troops, with different ethnicities being treated 
differently based on whether they are a “war-like” race or not. These troops, while still fighting 
alongside white regiments, were segregated in their regiments, and fought under white 
commanders. Therefore, Fogarty illustrated how French colonial soldiers in the nominally equal 
republican army were organized by notions of race that themselves were inherently based in 
inequality. He continues his study by looking at how colonial soldiers fit into the hierarchy of the 
French army, showing that they were almost always put under the command of white officers, 
and that there was little upward movement within the military hierarchy for colonial troops. 
Fogarty points to examples of less experienced white soldiers being given promotions over more 
experienced colored troops, decried by several African soldiers. Simply put, the racism inherent 
to the colonial system kept the Army from applying the republican egalitarian ideals it claimed to 
uphold to its colonial troops.2  
 Fogarty moves on to discuss the teaching and enforcing of the French language onto 
colonial troops, and draws an interesting parallel between the policies for French lingual 
hegemony in Metropolitan France as well as its colonies. The French language was imposed on 
the colonial troops and used as a way to further “civilize” their subjects. Again, this process of 
teaching the French language to troops is shown by Fogarty to be an interesting mesh of colonial 
and republican ideology. Lastly Fogarty brings forth how the French army government interacted 
with the Muslims within the colonial army, illustrating that changes in policy towards Islam 
                                                     
2 Fogarty, Race and War in France, 65-66 
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occurred for a large part to keep morale high within their regiments, combat German 
propaganda, and justify their fight against the Ottoman empire. Therefore, accommodations to 
Islam, as well as other foreign colonial religions, were done not as result of republican ideology, 
but instead as a need to keep the colonial army loyal to France3. Through these discussions, all 
heavily supported with various textual and archival references, Fogarty illustrates the paradoxical 
combination of republican and colonialist ideology that would characterize the experiences of the 
French colonial troops and their inability to reach full citizenship within the French Imperial 
system. 
 Throughout his book, Fogarty does an excellent job of combining a variety of sources, 
including army communications, personal letters of soldiers, and political discussions, to provide 
a convincing and well-referenced description of the condition and position of French colonial 
troops. Not only does Fogarty draw on a wide-ranging and expansive collection of documents to 
prove his points, he covers a larger swath of topics regarding colonial troops, ranging from how 
they were organized to how their various religions were accommodated. This gives the reader a 
truly holistic understanding of the views held by the French government and army on their 
colonial soldiers. Fogarty makes sure to include the reactions of the colonial troops to their 
treatment, illustrating that the interactions between these two groups are not one-sided. Lastly, 
Fogarty illustrates the great diversity of the colonial army, which is not often discussed. 
 Although Fogarty’s book is exhaustive regarding the experiences of colonial troops 
within a nominally republican egalitarian army, it would greatly benefit from some discussion of 
the experiences of the white troops within the army. The issue is that Fogarty provides few 
baselines for which to compare the lives of colonial troops.  For example, in terms of promotion 
                                                     
3 Ibid., 177-179 
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within the army, it would be worth discussing how likely it was for a regular white soldier to be 
promoted to a higher rank, if only to further prove the colonial racism inherent in the army. 
Although he does briefly discuss the British use of colonial troops, it would also be insightful to 
further compare across other armies. Overall, while Fogarty’s analysis and discussion are 
exceptional, it could have been more powerful had he done additional  comparisons with the 
experiences of French white troops within the army. 
 For anyone at all interested in the relationship between France and its colonies, Race and 
War in France is an excellent account of that relationship in terms of the First World War. 
Fogarty fully demonstrates not only the paradoxical nature of the republican colonial army, but 
also the French Colonial Empire as whole, as the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity 
formally expressed by the French republic are in direct conflict with the ideals needed to enforce 
a colonial system. While mainly focusing on the interactions between colonial troops and the 
army, Fogarty is still able to illustrate an in-depth and complete analysis of the views of colonial 
France on its subjects, as well categorizing the intermediate position between imperial subject 
and citizen occupied by French colonial soldiers. 
Empires in World War I is a collection of writings by several different authors all regarding 
colonial participation in First World War. The main argument proposed through these authors’ 
writings is that the First World War was truly a global conflict due to the imperial aspect of 
almost all the nations involved, and that the war itself resulted in several changes in the way that 
an empire was interpreted. The book is divided into four parts. The first discusses some of the 
aspects of colonial expansion, looking specifically at the contribution of the Belgian expansion in 
the Congo as well as general imperial expansion in the Pacific as helping set the scene for the 
First World War. The second part of the text focuses on the experiences and interactions of 
 
 8 
colonial soldiers within Europe during the war. Specifically dealing with the difficulties of 
accommodating Indian cultural practices in war hospitals, the accommodation of French Muslim 
soldiers in the colonial army, issues with military courts in Egypt and Palestine, and the 
unsegregated nature of Native American soldiers within the American Expeditionary Force. The 
3rd part deals with the results of an expanding presence of Imperial subjects in Europe as a result 
of the war and increased interaction between colonial subjects and their white European 
colonizers. These include shifting ideas of citizenship due to the military service of black 
colonial soldiers in the French army and increased missionary service in colonial Africa during 
the war. The fourth and final part of the book discusses lingering effects that the war had on the 
empires that participated in them, such as the prominence of West Indian servicemen in anti-
colonial movements in the Caribbean due to lack of recompense for their service by the British 
colonial government and cementation of the U.S. as an Imperial power across both North and 
South America. All four of these parts work together to illustrate the importance that the war 
played on shaping the ideas colonialism of the various European empires. Besides previous 
works dealing with more specific views of the various topics, the majority of primary sources 
used in this work were government and military reports. This means that government and 
military archives would be very important in gathering information regarding the ways in which 
the empires affected the Great War and vice versa.4 
Ruth Ginio argues that the preconceived notions regarding Africa that the French and many 
other Europeans had can be dated back to the period of the Enlightenment. She points to the 
works of several enlightenment thinkers, such as Voltaire, in order to illustrate what the view of 
Africa and Africans were at the time. Overall, European views on Africa were negative, to them 
                                                     
4 Andrew Tait Jarboe and Richard Standish Fogarty, Empires In World War I: Shifting Frontiers 
and Imperial Dynamics In a Global Conflic. (London: I.B. Tauris), 222-228. 
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it was a violent continent full of backwards people. These views would continue to grow and be 
bolstered by new white supremacist ideas such as scientific racism. These views would 
eventually be used to justify colonialism in Africa. Ginio continues to argue that views stemming 
from the racist position of being violent savages would both contribute to the creation of the 
French colonial army but also to propaganda used against it. Like previous works, Ginio 
demonstrates that the French colonial government believed that certain races were more war-like 
than others. These beliefs regarding fundamental differences in peoples due to race, along with 
the need to fight colonial wars, effectively led to the recruitment of local troops in French 
colonial armies.5 Ginio puts forth that due to the view that the French colonial project was a 
“civilizing mission”, French views of their African colonial subjects changed as well. No longer 
were they savages, but instead “grown children” who needed guidance and education to reach 
civilization. Ginio, through the evidence of French governmental records, shows that this was 
how the recruitment of colonial subjects to the French army was framed. Therefore, Ginio argues 
that the French view of Africans as excellent shock troops stems from the older imperial 
perception of Africans as savages. Other countries, specifically Germany, had not moved past 
that view, and instead relied on those old racist tropes to act as propaganda during the military 
occupation of Germany after the war. France in turn tried to combat these views, but was 
unsuccessful in doing so. This fact illustrates that the older view of African soldiers had not died, 
and that the French were slightly different in how their view of colonial African troops had 
developed. 
 Joe Lunn, through his article “'Les Races Guerrieres': Racial Preconceptions in the 
French Military about West African Soldiers during the First World War,” argues that French 
                                                     
5 Ruth Ginio, "French Officers, African Officers, and the Violent Image of African Colonial 
Soldiers," Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques 36, no. 2 (2010): 63-66. 
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notions of some races being more “warrior-like” than others had real consequences in the 
casualties experienced by the colonial French troops during the First World War. Lunn begins by 
emphasizing the belief held by many of the French military officials at the time that certain races 
were more apt at fighting than others. Lunn recognizes that these views stem from earlier ideas 
of races being more violent and savage. Over time, these ideas, bolstered by scientific racism, 
would meld with the republican ideas of the French Empire to form a paradoxical mission of 
colonization. The French would come to see their colonization efforts as a mission of civilizing 
their African subjects, who in time could become like the French. This argument was in fact used 
by supporters of the creation of a colonial army to justify the conscription of African troops. 
However, the cloud of scientific racism would continue to hang over this new view of the 
purpose of French colonialism, in the form of the idea of the “warrior-race”. Certain groups of 
people would be targeted for conscription since it was believed that they were more likely to do 
well in war. Lunn argues that this essentially led to West African troops being placed in very 
dangerous and difficult combat situations. To justify the existence of the belief in “warrior races” 
Lunn points to the writing of colonial governors who espoused such beliefs.6 To illustrate how 
these beliefs had real effects on the battlefield, Lunn analyzes the deployment methods for the 
black battalions, which were often placed in front of white battalions. Therefore, the West 
African troops, believed to be “warrior race” troops, were more likely to receive the worst of the 
fighting since they were the front line, but it was justified as it was believed that they would fight 
with unwavering ferocity. What this article does extremely well is illustrate how beliefs and 
                                                     
6Joe Lunn, "'Les Races Guerrieres': Racial Preconceptions in the French Military about West 




preconceived notions about colonial troops can have real world consequences on their use in the 
army. 
 In another one of his writings, Lunn addresses other three main topics, those being the 
policy of the French government for the deployment of colonial African soldiers in the French 
metropole, the character of the interactions between Senegalese soldiers and the French public, 
and the ways in which French perception of West Africans changed due to their deployment on 
the front. While Senegalese soldier were often praised at their arrival, many fears based in racism 
lingered within the French government and military. Lunn notes that the camps at which 
Senegalese and other colonial African soldiers were based when not at the front were often 
purposefully isolated. When deployed, black soldiers almost always served under white officers. 
These facts, Lunn argues, was a result of the racism that existed within the French military and 
within the colonial system. The camps also tended to be segregated, meaning it would be very 
rare to have white soldiers training in proximity to black soldiers. The interactions between 
Senegalese soldiers and the French public was highly limited and, when they did occur, were 
with the intention to chiefly show the power of the French colonial soldiers in their fight for 
France.7 However, interactions between black soldiers and French civilians increased when they 
were wounded in battle and were cared for in military hospitals. Lunn also argues that the French 
perception of West Africans changed, mostly due to the fact that this was the first time that such 
meaningful interaction could take place. Lunn states that there was a general feeling of sympathy 
in the French metropole towards the Senegalese soldiers. Where meaningful connections were 
made, long lasting friendships could be made between French and Senegalese soldiers, as 
evidence by personal accounts cited by Lunn. Overall, Lunn argues that while interaction 
                                                     
7 Joe Lunn, "'Bons Soldats' and 'sales Nègres': Changing French Perceptions of West African 
Soldiers during the First World War," French Colonial History 1 (2002): 8-10. 
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between the French population and the Senegalese soldiers was limited, the interaction that did 
occur caused positive views to grow towards West African soldiers. 
Historian William Dean focus on the interaction between Moroccan subjects in the 
empire and their colonial overlords, as well as their perception of their North African subjects. 
Dean argues that because the French army was composed of several diversely trained forces, 
they were able to be very effective in both the suppressing of tribal rebellions in Morocco and 
the trench warfare of the Great War. Dean also argues that fighting in Morocco could almost be 
viewed as a training ground for troops, allowing those battalions involved to be better prepared 
for the war on the European continent. Lastly, Dean argues that the balance between preserving 
colonial order and rule in Morocco and having enough troops to fight on the Western front 
tended to lean in favor of having more troops fighting in France, suggesting that the French 
government placed a much higher importance on defending the metropole as opposed to 
preserving the colonial empire.8 Dean draws on several examples to support his arguments. 
Through various internal military documents, Dean argues that the combination of fairly mobile 
units of both Native Moroccan and Native French soldier in the colonial wars was significantly 
effective in suppressing rebellions if they had sufficient numbers of troops.  
By citing the colonial government of Morocco at the time, Dean also shows that the 
French government believed that the Moroccan troops would perform well in the Western Front 
in Europe, which other military records demonstrated that they did. Lastly, Dean illustrates 
through his collection of government correspondences that the French government was quick to 
request the troops fighting in Morocco to return to France to fight Germany. Even when there 
                                                     
8 William Dean, "Strategic Dilemmas of Colonization: France and Morocco during the Great 




were issues of rebellion within the colony, the French government believed it more important to 
put forth the maximum amount of resources possible for the defense of the metropole. This 
document is very useful in that it highlights the racial hierarchy that was often accepted within 
the French military command. The French generals believed that the Moroccans were a “warrior 
race”, and would therefore make the best fighters.9 While, the Moroccan units did fight well, 
they did not do so because of some innate ability to do so, but instead had been accustomed to it 
due to the colonial wars already occurring in Morocco. Therefore, Dean illustrates the scientific 
racism often accepted as fact by the French army, which in turn greatly affected how they treated 
their soldiers. 
 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner argue that the First World War was a turning point in how 
the French Government viewed their colonies. The authors claim that before 1914, very little 
thought had been given to the use of French African colonies as pools of both natural resources 
and manpower. While the “tirailleurs senegalais” had seen successful action in the largely 
unsuccessful Franco-Prussian war, little had been done to build off the success the Second 
Empire had with colonial soldiers. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner suggest that it wasn’t until the 
heavy losses of French soldiers on the Western Front at the start of the war that intense attention 
was placed on the large-scale recruitment of colonial subjects to fight on the front. As evidenced 
through military high command correspondences, there were some conflicts regarding the 
efficacy of the force noire, as views of racial hierarchy tainted objective understandings of why 
under-trained West African troops might fare badly during the harsh European winters.10 
                                                     
9 Dean, "Strategic Dilemmas of Colonization,” 745. 
10 C. M Andrew  and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, "France, Africa, and the First World War." The 
Journal of African History 19, no. 1 (1978): 14-17 
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However, Andrew and Kanya-Forstner illustrate through the writing of Prime Minister 
Clemenceau that regardless of complaints regarding the African Colonial Troops, recruitment 
would continue in order to hold out as long as needed against the German offensives. What is 
interesting to mention, and is highlighted in the article, is that Clemenceau was not concerned 
with the possibility of a revolt in the colonies due to increased recruitment, as he considered 
France’s need for troops more important. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner show that the 
conscriptions of these colonial troops led to many political consequences, such as the possibility 
of gaining French citizenship through service. Andrew and Kanya-Forstner also argue that the 
outbreak of war led to a greater economic involvement of France with her colonies. Before the 
war most of the trade between France and its colonial empire occurred in Algeria. This changed 
with shortages in food supply which forced greater trade across the empire, especially with West 
Africa.11 Overall, Andrew and Kanya-Forstner effectively argue that the First World War was a 
time of great change regarding how the French government viewed its colonial holdings. 
Through various internal government documents, it is demonstrated that the lands originally 
neglected by the French government came to be viewed as pools of limitless resources and 
manpower. 
  
                                                     
11 Ibid., 20. 
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Fighting for the French Empire before 1910 
 
It is important to be aware of the historical context of the French colonial army in order 
to better understand its creation and its mission. Even before the First World, France had made 
use of its colonial subjects as soldiers. Mostly this was done during colonial expeditions, as 
native troops were better accustomed to the environment where they were fighting and lessened 
the need to transport troops from metropolitan France. While not part of the official army of 
France, various colonial subjects and allies would play an important role in the conquering and 
holding of colonial territories. French colonial troops would even see action, albeit limited, in the 
Franco-Prussian war of the 1870s. However, while there was a history of the use of colonial 
troops in a military fashion, there was no larger army tradition or structure that allowed for the 
enlistment of colonial troops in the regular French army.12 
 This would change right before the First World War, as new ideas would come into play 
regarding the uses of the French colonies in warfare. Certain military officials, such as then 
lieutenant-colonel Mangin, would suggest that the populations of the French colonies could be 
enlisted in the regular army, giving France a powerful strategic advantage over its rivals. This 
enlistment of indigenous colonial peoples would also serve to further the “civilizing mission” 
used to justify French colonialism. What this leads to is an interesting combination of French 
republicanism and colonial theory grounded in white supremacy. This is further expressed in 
Colonel Mangin’s la Force Noire, which brings these two conflicting views together into a 
somewhat cohesive view on French colonial subjects. 
  
                                                     
12 Andrew and Kanya-Forstner. “France Africa and the First World War,” 12-13. 
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La Force Noire; Mangin’s Manifesto 
 
 Published in 1910, then Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mangin’s book La Force Noire 
(translated to The Black Force) covers a large variety of topics. However, its main purpose was 
to argue for the creation of a French colonial army composed of non-white soldiers. This army 
would not only be used within the colonies themselves, but also in the case of a future European 
war on the continent. This idea to create a standing army from colonial subjects to fight in 
European wars was a revolutionary idea at the time. The ways in which Mangin imagines this 
colonial army and the assumptions he makes illustrate French understanding of race at the time, 
and reveal some of the major contradictions that plague both the French Empire and the French 
Colonial Army 
 Mangin’s book is divided into four larger sections, with each being subdivided in 
chapters. He begins his first section of the book by discussing the population of the metropole of 
France. He compared various types of data, including population and marriage data, in order to 
argue that while the French population was growing, it would not be sufficient to field enough 
soldiers for the next war in Europe. He argued that France needed an increased birth rate, 
promoting laws that would encourage having multiple children. His next focus was on the armies 
of Europe, stressing the important aspect of numerical superiority. In this chapter he begins to 
discuss the use of Black African and Algerian soldiers to gain such an advantage.13 
 The next major section of his writing discusses the history of the use of black people and 
people of color as soldiers in war, beginning with Ancient Egypt. He goes on to talk about how 
the various Arab empires made use of black regiments. In the next chapter he brings forth more 
modern examples of African soldiers, including the Haitian revolution and the Black regiment 
                                                     
13 Charles Mangin, La Force Noire (Paris: Librarie Hachette et Cie, 1910), 68-69. 
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used by the Union in the American Civil War. This section reveals the scientific racism accepted 
as fact at the time of publication with statements such as “Arabs are the most ungovernable of all 
races.” This section also illustrates the scientific racist view that black Africans made good 
soldiers because they were inherently adapted to warfare, a “warrior race.”14 Through his claims 
and his “historical” study of the use of black soldiers, Mangin wanted to illustrate that Africans 
were capable of being extremely good soldier, which went against the prevailing view of 
Africans as inferior in all ways to whites. In essence, Mangin dismisses some racist claims and 
held up others in order to make it seem that recruiting African subjects would lead to a powerful 
fighting force.15 
 At the end of this section, he discusses other ways in which black soldiers would be a 
benefit to the French republic, again citing scientific racist view of Africans as more tenacious 
fighters. However, he also discusses how their colonial subjects will be loyal to France, going as 
far as to say that “It is a real French army we have in the Senegalese Tirailleurs (soldiers)…” 
Comments like these give a slim vision of equality, as Mangin is able to see to a certain extent a 
“Frenchness” in African soldiers, even if it is just in their military capabilities. Mangin finishes 
his book by saying that the African colonies are an untapped pool of manpower, another resource 
of the colonies to exploit for France.  However, the numbers he gives for conscriptable men for 
the colonial empire are way overinflated.16   
 Mangin’s La Force Noire, illustrates how the French colonial army was created both as a 
way to exploit another resource of the French colonies, manpower, but also as way to further the 
                                                     
14 Mangin, La Force Noire, 111-113. 
15 Joe Lunn, "Remembering the "Tirailleurs Sénégalais" and the Great War: Oral History as a 
Methodology of Inclusion in French Colonial Studies," French Colonial History 10 (2009): 126-
127, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41935196. 
16 Mangin, La Force Noire, 245-249. 
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civilizing mission of France. The colonial forces were based in both the ideas of scientific racism 
and the belief that people of color could become just as good soldiers as the white Frenchmen of 
the metropole. This contradiction, present in Mangin’s inception of the colonial army, would 
continue to be present as the army was finally formed in the First World War. 
Assembling an Army 
 
 While Mangin argued vehemently for the creation of his colonial army, he wasn’t 
incredibly successful until several years after publication. Soon to be Senegalese Deputy Blaise 
Diagne supported the creation of the colonial army, as he viewed the institution as a way for 
colonial subjects to gain equality with white Frenchman. This fits into the traditional French 
archetype of the citizen-soldier, where by fighting for France one guarantees their citizenship in 
the Republic. This view also fits with Mangin’s argument of the army acting as an agent of 
France’s “civilizing” mission to Africa, another “benefit” besides increased manpower. Either 
way, to certain members of the black French colonial elite, the colonial army would be a way to 
gain privileges denied to most colonial subjects due to the institutionalized racism of the French 
colonial system.17 
 However, for this exact reason, many of the French colonial administrators and governors 
were in opposition to Mangin’s plan. By allowing colonial subjects to bypass the 
institutionalized racism that held up the French colonial order through service in the army, the 
colonial force could cause the collapse of the entire colonial system heavily based on white 
supremacy. The domination of the French over their colonial subjects would also be brought into 
question if true equality was achieved. There were other reasons for opposing the colonial army 
                                                     
17 Joe Lunn, Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War 
(Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999), 68-71. 
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as well, mostly revolving around how it would threaten the established colonial order.18 The new 
force would require the conscription of many colonial subjects, which would not always join 
their overlords ranks so easily. This plan for a colonial army would also lead to the training and 
arming of non-white colonial troops, which was thought to be dangerous by the colonial elites as 
it made rebellion easier in their eyes. Lastly, designating colonial troops for use during European 
wars would mean a lack of troops within the colonies themselves during war.19 Therefore, 
colony administrators believed they would have a lesser ability to maintain order within their 
lands, as they would be down on troops. Overall, most of the concerns came from the French 
colonial elite, who saw the creation of a large non-white colonial army as a threat to the colonial 
order on which they relied. 
 Though some small units were mobilized before 1914, the idea of a grand colonial army 
didn’t gain much traction until the outbreak of World War One. With the front solidified and the 
transition to total war, the idea of an untapped pool of manpower became very attractive. 
Campaigns grew in size within the French African colonies. Realizing that the war would not be 
over by Christmas, recruitment drives where increased even more in 1915, supported as well by 
Blaise Diagne. By then, Mangin’s project of a French colonial army was realized. 
Black Soldiers and White Officers 
 
 The paradox of racism and acceptance present in Magin’s original plan for a force made 
up of colonial subjects would continue to exist in the organization of the army itself. While the 
army was seen as a meritocratic institution where anyone could rise up as a citizen soldier, there 
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were obvious barriers for non-white soldiers. Almost all regiments of colonial troops were led by 
white French officers, regardless if there were better or more experienced colonial soldiers who 
could take their place. Race therefore trumped meritocracy. Scientific racism permeated into 
military strategy, as the supposed “warrior race” qualities of colonial troops made them better 
suited for close quarters and intense combat. Therefore, non-white regiments tended to be used 
as shock troops due to these racialized beliefs held by the French military.20 Colonial soldiers 
were sometimes kept in separate camps from their white soldiers, and while they could interact 
with the general French metropole populace, their interaction with civilians was often kept under 
tough scrutiny by their superiors. Another issue was the use of the French language, which was 
heavily enforced for both logistical reasons and as part of France’s civilizing mission to its 
colonies.21 
 While these racist elements of the French colonial army definitely characterized the 
institution and were a major part of its organization, the army did provide a conduit in which 
non-white soldiers could achieve certain elements of equality with their white compatriots. 
Military honors and recognitions were not withheld from colonial soldiers. While not usually 
awarded with promotion up the military hierarchy, military medallions for valor and bravery in 
the fields of battle were given to colonial non-white soldiers. Non-white soldiers also fought in 
the same battles as white French soldiers, often serving in mixed regiments.22 This would 
contrast greatly with how the American commanding officers would treat their non-white 
soldiers, relegating them to logistical work behind the frontlines and separating them entirely 
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from white regiments. For the French, colonial troops fought, died, and were buried alongside 
white soldiers on the frontlines and in the trenches of the Great War. In the one instance of battle, 
non-white colonial soldiers had achieved an equality with white French metropole citizens. 
However, the institutional racism which governed the French colonial army would continue to 
keep true equality with white soldiers out of reach. 
Circulaire Linard; Differences in Understanding of Race between America and France 
 
 While the French colonial army was embedded in the ideals of scientific racism and the 
civilizing mission used to justify colonialism, it was actually quite progressive in the elements of 
equality given to non-white troops when compared to the way in which the American 
expeditionary force dealt with its black soldiers. Black soldiers, when under American 
command, rarely if ever saw combat. They were relegated to labor intensive supply work, acting 
solely as a source of manual labor. The few regiments that did see combat were under French 
command, which illustrates the difference between how the French and American military 
valued non-white people as soldiers.23 African-American troops under French command 
received roughly equivalent treatment to that of France’s colonial troops. 
 This difference in how race was approached by the French and American militaries is 
best seen through the infamous “Circulaire Linard”. This document, reflecting the view of the 
American Expeditionary force leadership, was a French internal military memo to the 
commanding officers essentially asking the French to discriminate more against black American 
soldiers under their command. The document espoused many racist views commonly held by 
white Americans, such as the idea that black American were more prone to vice and that they 
were a threat to the safety of white Americans within the republic. The document had three main 
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requests. The first being to not treat black officers as equals to white ones, by doing things such 
as eating with them, shaking their hands, or by meeting with them outside of military 
requirements. The second was to not commend the troops too highly, especially in the presence 
of white Americans. The last was to limit interaction between black Americans and white French 
citizens, especially white women.24 These requests criticize all the ways in which the French 
army provided some sort of equality between white and non-white troops. Americans saw this 
limited equality as a threat to their social order, a similar complaint to those of the administrators 
of the French colonies. Nevertheless, this document highlights the great difference in which race 
was dealt with between the American and French armies. Fortunately, very little evidence exists 
to show that the French caved in to the requests of the “Circulaire”, and the copies being 
distributed among the French military were systematically destroyed.25 26 
Remembrance after the War 
 
 The story of colonial soldiers does not end in 1918. After the war, many monuments and 
mausoleums were constructed in honor of those who served in the Great War. The Grand 
Mosque of Paris was constructed in part as a way of displaying gratitude for the Muslim 
Tirailleurs, Zouaves, Spahis and Goumiers who had given their life in defense of France. In 1924 
a monument dedicated specifically to the colonial soldiers of France “Aux Heros de l’Armee 
Noire” was inaugurated in the city of Reims, where the regiments were placed right on the 
frontline for most of the war. Dedicated to the colonial soldiers who defended the city against 
multiple German attacks, the monument featured four African soldiers and a white officer. 
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Simultaneously, an identical monument was erected and still exists in front of Bamako’s station 
in the then Afrique Occidentale colony, today’s Mali. Both of these monuments illustrate that to 
the French, the colonial soldiers who fought in the war were important aspects of the war that 
needed to be remembered. It should be noted that during the occupation of France during the 
Second World War, the monument in Reims was immediately removed in 1940 and destroyed by 
Nazi forces, such a tribute being viewed as a threat to the white-aryan supremacy that made the 
basis of Nazi ideology. However, in the 1960s, the monument was reconstructed as a simple 
obelisk, once again honoring the colonial soldiers who fought for the defense of the city of 
Reims. In 2013 a historical replica of the original bronze monument was erected in a nearby city 




Conclusion and Avenues of Further Study 
 
 The French colonial army, both as imagined by Mangin and as it was implemented 
during the First World War, was marred by contradictions. Born out of both colonialist ideals 
and scientific racist ideas, the colonial army became a place wherein non-white soldier could 
reach some level of equality with white French metropole soldiers. While this equality across 
racial lines was very limited, it was nonetheless quite progressive for the time, especially 
compared with the hardline segregationist views then held by the American Army as exposed in 
the “Circulaire Linard”. Through the monuments erected in honor of the colonial soldiers who 
fought and died for France during the war, it can be seen that they left an important mark on the 
cultural history of the First World War in France. 
 While this paper focused on the way in which colonial troops factored into the 
understanding of race by the French army, it would be also worthwhile to study how fighting 
against non-white troops was viewed and interpreted by the Germans during the Great War. This 
was the first time non-white soldiers were used en-masse against a white opponent in an 
European war. How did the Germany and other members of the Triple alliance conceptualize this 
challenge to their own brand of white supremacy?  It would also be important to investigate 
whether there were interactions between non-white French colonial troops and black American 
troops, and if there were, to see if they ever found common ground as both were subjected to 





8-10 octobre 1915, Choisy au Bac, Aisne, France 
« ..nous croisons des régiments de toutes sortes infanterie, artillerie, cavalerie plutôt des africains 
qu’autre chose.. 
…un cimetière nouveau renferme les tombes de spahis, tirailleurs, alpins et quelques Boches.. » 
 
English Translation of Excerpt 
 
8-10 October 1915, Choisy au Bac. Aisne, France 
“We come across regiments of all sorts; infantry, artillery, cavalry. Mainly Africans 
…a new cemetery includes the tombs of spahis [North African], tirailleurs [Senegalese], 
chasseurs alpins [White French], and some Boches [German]…” 
- Charles Desire Brasseur 
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